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Landowners and property rights advocates
challenging the application of the Endangered
Species Act ("ESA or "the Act')' mistakenly
believe the judicial doctrine of ripeness impos-
es an insurmountable obstacle between legiti-
mate takings claims and rulings on the merits."
They fear property owners will be unable to
gain access to the Court of Federal Claims
without first jumping through an endless num-
ber of bureaucratic hoops, which such
landowners neither have the time nor money
to endure. Consequently, these landowners
and property rights advocates recommend
Congress either modify the ESA or adopt
.property rights" legislation in order to assist
landowners in gaining compensation for gov-
ernment regulation of their land.'
However there is not a single case in the
history of the Court of Federal Claims or
Federal Circuit where a property owner has
claimed a taking due to the application of the
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I. Endangered Species Act of 1973. 16 UiS.C. §§ 1531-44
(1994),
2 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Ensdangered Spece Act. A
Case Study in Takings & Incextivs. 49 Swi. L Rv. 305. 327 (Jan.
1997). Robin L Rivett. Why TkeAre So Few Tkings Cases Under te
Endangered Species Art. or Some Mdpor Ostalers to Takings Liabilities.
SB14 AU-ABA 507. 528-29 (Oct. 17. 1996). Interview with Scott
Jacobs, Office of Congressman Jr Saxton (Jan. 1996).
This belief may stem, in part. from articles criticizing the
application of the ripeness doctrine in general land use cases.
See. eg. Michael M. Berger, e "Ripeess Mess in Federal Land Use
Ca or How te Supriwe Court Convered Federal Judges into Fruit
Peddlers. INsT. oti Pi. ZoNi4c; & Ewtinmcr Dohwir 7 (1991). See also
Gregory Overstreet, T Rpeness Doctrine of the Takings Clause- A
Surrey o Decisions SAm Just How Far Federal Courts Will Go to Anid
Adjudicating Land Use, 10 1, LANo UsE & Envm7 L 91 (1994). Such
articles, however, have focused on cases dealing with local zon-
Ing regulations, not federal environmental laws.
3 See. egHR. 495 and H.R. 1142. 106thCong. 13,19
(1999). See aho S. 1364, 104th Cong. § 20 (1995) (proposing revi-
sion of the Endangered Species Act to grant compensation for
any substantial diminution in land value caused by the Acrs
implementation, and essentially eliminating the ripeness
requirement).
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ESA and been denied access to the court for
lack of ripeness.' When hearing wetlands tak-
ings cases, which involve issues similar to
endangered species cases, the Court of Federal
Claims has given a very generous interpreta-
tion of the Supreme Court's ripeness cases.
Based on these wetlands holdings and the lan-
guage of the Supreme Court's doctrine, a prop-
erty owner claiming a taking under the ESA
should have little trouble getting into court, so
long as she makes a good faith effort in seeking
an "incidental take" permit under section 10 of
the Act.' If a landowner does not make such an
effort, then it hardly seems fair that she should
be able to demand payment from the govern-
ment when, in fact, a development permit may
be issued.6
II. Supreme Court Doctrine
The basic rule for ripeness in the takings
arena is that a claim only becomes ready for
judicial review when a regulating agency has
made a "final decision" as to the quality and
extent of development permitted on a parcel of
property that a landowner seeks to develop or
4. Because most such claims would be filed in the Court
of Federal Claims, this article will focus on that court. However,
there is only one example in all the federal courts of a landowner
challenging the application of the ESA and being denied access
to court on ripeness grounds. See Four Points Utility Joint Venture
v. United States, 40 E.R.C. 1509. 1510-11 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (ESA
takings claim found not ripe because plaintiff failed to apply for
an "incidental take" permit). For examples of state court treat-
ment of ripeness in the endangered species context, see Boise
Cascade Corp. v. State of Oregon, 991 P.2d 563 (Or. App. 1999)
(holding takings claim unripe where plaintiff failed to apply foran
Incidental take permit). See also Killington. Ltd. v. State of
Vermont, 668 A.2d 1278 (1995) (holding takings claim unripe
where permit denial contained mitigation measures that would
satisfy endangered species concerns and allow for development).
Aside from Four Points Utility, the federal courts have only
decided two ESA takings cases, neither of which found a taking.
See Chnsty v. Hodel. 857 F.2d 1324.1335 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. i 114 (1989) (no taking where ESA prohibited landowner
from shooting endangered grizzly bear that was killing landown-
er's sheep); United States v. Kepler, 531 F.2d 796. 797 (6th Cir.
1976) (no taking where Endangered Species Act prohibited inter-
state transport of endangered species acquired before passage of
the Act). See also Robert Meltz, Where the Wild Things Are: The
Endangered Species Act and Private Property, 24 ENvn.. L. 369, 385
(1994) (noting the extreme rarity of takings claims involving the
ESA).
Given the scarcity of takings cases dealing with the ESA,
this article is primarily meant to address public concern, rather
than problems widely felt. Critics of npeness in the endangered
otherwise alter.! In reaching the stage where a
court will accept an agency decision as final, a
landowner must first submit a "meaningful
application" to the regulatory body in charge,
proposing a specific use or course of develop-
ment for the regulated land, unless doing so
would be pointless.' If a landowner's first appli-
cation is denied, a court may recuire reappli-
cation, unless reapplication would be futile."
Finally, the Court requires landowners to apply
for a variance from the regulation limiting their
development, if such a procedure is available
within the regulation.iO When a landowner has
fulfilled these obligations, the cla!m is ripe.
A. The Doctrine Applied
I. Final Decision
The Supreme Court established the doc-
trine for ripeness in the land use context In
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v.
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City," and MacDonald,
Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County.'2 The essential
element of the ripeness test is tha: the regulat-
ing body must make a "final decision" before a
claim may be brought. As stated in Williamson,
"a claim that the application of government
species context assert a pervasive problem, but provide few spe-
cific examples. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 327. Given the
inability to respond to such undefined claims, most of the dis-
cussion in this article is based on hypotheticai situations that
may arise sometime In the future, rather than actual situations
landowners face. Consequently, even when the hypothetical
obstacles seem to be at their greatest, It should be remembered
that only one landowner, In fact, has ever been denied access to
court for failing to present a ripe claim under the ESA.
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a),
6. See Four Points Utility, 40 E.R.C. at 1511 ('[Plalntiffs must
make ian] application for a permit before the Ccurt may properly
consider the merits of plaintiffs' claims.").
7. See Williamson County Reg'I Plan. Conm'n v. Hamilton
Bank of Johnson City. 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985). Ste also
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348
(1986). See also Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'] Plan. Agercy, 520 U.S, 725,
739(1997).
8. See MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 352 n.8. See also Lucas v, South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003. 1014 n.3 (1992),
9. See MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 352-53 nn.8-9 ("IFIutile reap-
plications are not contemplated:).
10. See Williarnson, 473 U.S. at 191 n.12 ("[llt Is Impossible
to determine the extent of the loss or interferen:e until the ireg-
ulating agencyl has decided whether It will grant a variance from
the application of the regulations.").
11. 473 U.S. 172(1985),
12. 477 U.S. 340 (1986),
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regulations effects a taking of a property inter-
est is not ripe until the government entity
charged with implementing the regulations
has reached a final decision regarding the
application of the regulations to the property
at issue." And, as stated in MacDonald, "an
essential prerequisite to [the assertion of a
regulatory takings claim I is a final and author-
itative determination of the type and intensity
of development legally permitted on the sub-
ject property."4 The rationale for such a rule is
that "al court cannot determine whether a reg-
ulation has gone 'too far' unless it knows how
far the regulation goes.""
While the language of the two cases sug-
gests that before a claim is ripe the regulating
agency must provide a specific and clear per-
mit denial, describing exactly what sort of
development would be permitted on the sub-
ject property, the Supreme Court has, in fact,
not required such detailed denials before find-
ing a claim ripe. For example, in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v.- New York City, the Court
found Penn Central's claim ripe, even where
the denial of the building permit did not detail
the extent and intensity of development that
would ultimately be permitted on the subject
property.
16
The Court of Federal Claims has also been
very generous in providing access when a "final
13. Williamson. 473 U.S. at 186.The Court also noted that a
denial will not be considered a -final decision" unless it "conclu-
sively determinels whether Ithe landownerl will be denied all
reasonable beneficial use of Ithel property.' Id. at 194. The
landowner, however, is not necessarily required to exhaust all
administrative remedies "directed at reversing the government
denial" to present a npe takings claim. Christina Inv. Corp. v.
United States. 40 Fed. CI. 571. 578 (1998) (holding denial of wet-
lands permit a -final decision" and therefore ripe for judicial
review). See also Williamsoni 473 U.S. at 192 ('The question whether
administrative remedies must be exhausted Is conceptually dls-
tinct I I from the question of whether an administrative action
must be final before it is judicially reviewable.).
14. MacDonald. 477 U.S. at 348. See also Suilum 520 U.S. at
740 (holding claim npe where development agency denied all use
of the subiect parcel; the landowners property fell entirely with-
in an area zoned for protection against additional land coverage
or other permanent disturbances).
15. Id. in Williamson. the Court noted
among the factors of particular significance in Ideter-
mining if there has been a takingi are the economic
impact of the challenged action and the extent to
which it interferes with reasonable Investment-backed
expectations. [Citations omittedl. Those factors sim-
ply cannot be evaluated until the administrative
decision" has been anything but clear and
detailed. For example, in City National Bank of
Miami v. United States," a wetlands taking case,
the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") denied
a permit application, noting only that "the
project, as proposed, may not be the least
environmentally damaging practicable alterna-
tive."'5 While this hardly detailed the "type and
intensity of development legally permitted on
the sublect property,"' the court found the
denial to be a "final decision.- When an agency
has provided such a vague denial, the Court of
Federal Claims, rather than require reapplica-
tion to find exactly what level of development
the agency would allow, has consistently found
that a "final decision" has been made, and the
claim therefore ripe."
2. Meanlngful Application
From a landowner's perspective, the first
step toward obtaining a "final decision" is the
submission of a "meaningful application" for a
development permit.2' While the Supreme
Court, the Court of Federal Claims and the
Federal Circuit have yet to precisely define
.meaningful," none have been noticeably strict
in applying this standard. At the very least, it is
clear that a landowner's initial application will
not be considered "meaningful" if it proposes a
project that is "exceedingly grandiose" and
agency has amved at a final, definitive position
regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to
the particular land In question.
473 U.S.at 191.
16. 438U.S 104.117-18(1978).
17. 30 Fed. CL 715 (1994).
18 Id- at717.
19 MacDonmld. 477 US. at 348.
20 See Formanek v. United States. 18 CL Ct. 785 (1989)
(finding the Corpss permit denial was final since 'the Corpss
decision provided no encouragement to plaintiffs regarding any
commercial use of their property"). See Ao Ciampetti v. United
States. 18 CL CL 548 (1989) (holding plaintiffs claim was npe
even though the Corps had informed plaintiff that no permit
could Issue until the necessary state permits and certifications
were obtained and plaintiff failed to pursue these); Beure-Co. v.
United States. 16 CI, Ct- 42 (198) (holding that even though the
Corps asked for additional mitigation measures, and plaintiff
failed to provide any. it would have been futile for plaintiff to sub-
mit additional applications because the Corps had not provded
any Indication that there were "appropriate or practicable7 miti-
gation steps that could cure the adverse ecological effects of
plaintiffs development proposal').
21 MKDoald. 477 UoS. at 352-53 n.8.
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shows no effort to mitigate its impacts.2
Therefore, a landowner will not surmount the
"meaningful application" requirement if she
submits a development proposal so extrava-
gant that it will undoubtedly be denied, if there
is a good chance something less aggressive
could be accepted.
If it is clear that any and every proposal
would be denied, a landowner need not apply
at all. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the
Supreme Court found a claim ripe where no
application had been filed at all, noting that
applying for a permit would have been "point-
less."" The Court of Federal Claims recently
applied this exception in a wetlands taking
case, Broadwater Farms Joint Venture v. United States,
holding that a landowner's claim was ripe with-
out the landowner's having applied for a sec-
tion 404 permit at all." In Broadwater Farms, the
22. In MacDonald, the Supreme Court's only case dealing
with the "meaningful application" prong, the Court was facedwith
a proposal to subdivide a parcel of agncultural land into 159 res-
idential lots. The proposal was denied, among other reasons, for
failing to provide adequate "public access, sanitation services,
water supplies, and fire and police protection." MacDonald, 477
U.S. at 344. Rather than trying to remedy the proposal's faults, the
landowners immediately filed a takings claim. The Supreme
Court found their claim unripe because the proposal was
"exceedingly grandiose" and the landowners made no attempt to
submit -less ambitious plans," thereby rendering their single
application not "meaningful." Id. at 352-53 nn.8-9.
23. 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 n.3 (1992). In the Court's opinion,
an application would have been pointless because "the Council
stipulated that no building permit would have been issued
under the 1988 Act, application or no application." Id. Following
this standard, the Federal Circuit, in Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United
States, found that applying for a surface mining permit under the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act was not necessary
at all, because to do so would have been futile. 926 F.2d 1169
(Fed. Cir. 1991). But see Greenbner v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl.
689, 692 (1998) ('The futility exception may be applied in certain
situations to excuse a property owner from utilizing variance or
othersimilar procedures aftera government denial of a proposed
use, but not to excuse a property owner from applying for per-
mission to engage in the proposed use as an initial manner.').
Lucas and Whitney Benefitsshould not be read to suggest that
the courts have abandoned the "meaningful application" prong.
In Eastern Minerals International, Inc. v. United States the court found
that having a neighbor's mining permit denied was not enough to
establish "pointlessness" for a landowner who had submitted no
application whatsoever. See Eastern Minerals Int'l, Inc. v. United
States, 36 Fed. Cl. 541, 548 (1996). ("Although Van Buren (the
adjacent landowner) may have faced the same delay Eastern
endured, this is the sort of speculation that the ripeness doctrine
seeks to avoid. ICitation omittedl. Each plaintiff must satisfy the
threshold requirement of a single meaningful application ").
See also Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. United States, 752 F.2d 627 (Fed.
Cir. 1985); Conant v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 689 (1987). Despite
this statement, the court found that plaintiff's takings claim was
ripe as to all five tracts of its land, even though plaintiff only sub-
court believed that the Corps had demonstrat-
ed that "development could not go forward in
the wetlands,"' and that "In 1o reasonable land-
owner would find a 'door left open for obtain-
ing a permit."" While one might disagree with
the court's conclusion of "pointlessness" based
on the particular facts of Broadwater Farms, the
Court of Federal Claims, in light of its findings,
properly applied the Lucas exception. 7 And,
stretching the "pointlessness" exception a step
further than Lucas and Broadwater Farms, the
Court of Federal Claims recently found a claim
ripe where no application had been made, and
held that "if the process is a futile one, or so
burdensome that it effectively deprives the
property of value, then this court is inclined to
find that a compensable taking occurred.""'
The basic rule remains that while a land-
owner must generally make a "meaningful
mitted a coal-mining permit application for one of the plots. The
denial of the first application, the court believed, demonstrated
that applications for the other plots would have been pointless
because it was "unlikely" that such applications would have been
accepted. Eastern Minerals, 36 Fed. Cl. at 547. ("Other proposals
would have been denied by OSM. Various feceral and state
offices were opposed to any mining on the subject properties,
and OSM's broad reading of the 'adverse effect;' provision lof
SMCRA] made it unlikely that Eastern would obtain a permit to
mine any of the tracts.") (emphasis added). Of ccurse, 'unlikely"
seems a rather low threshold to establish pointle ;sness,
24. 35 Fed. Cl. 232 (1996), vacated on other grunds, 27 ENWrL
L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,516 (Fed. Cr. 1997) (remanded claim to
determine whether Broadwater was entitled to compensation
under a partial takings analysis, without questioning the lower
court's holding on ripeness). But see Lakewooc Associates v.
United States, 45 Fed. Ci. 320 (1999) (holding takings claim
unnpe where the plaintiff failed to secure an appealable final
decision on a wetlands development permit appll:ation).
25. Id. at 236.
26. Id. at 237.
27. Of particular Interest In the court's analysis Is its
emphasis on the Corps's failure to suggest that plaintiff apply for
a section 404 permit. See id. at 232. The Corps "did not suggest that
Broadwater Farms could apply for a permit." Id. (emphasis
added). As with many of the Court of Federal Claims' cases deal-
ing with the reapplication prong of the ripenes; test, see Infra
notes 33-42 and accompanying text, such an approach seems to
presume pointlessness or futility until the regulating agency
proves otherwise. By doing so, the court puts a significant burden
on the regulating agency to demonstrate that applliatlon or reap-
plication would not be futile, rather than assuming as much until
the plaintiff proves otherwise.
28. Stearns Co., Ltd. v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 264, 272
(1995) (granting plaintiff the right to bring facial challenge to
waiver process in Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act)
(emphasis added). See also Eastern Minerals Int'l, Inc, v. United
States, 36 Fed. Cl. 541, 548 (1996) (finding claim ilpe as to four
tracts of land for which plaintiff had not submitted mining permit
applications, and then finding that a compensable taking had
Jomes Rosen VuM= 6, Number I
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application" before a takings claim is ripe, a
claim will be considered ripe if submitting such
an application would be pointless or exceed-
ingly burdensome.
3. Reapplication
After a landowner has submitted an appli-
cation and been denied, a landowner may be
required to reapply, unless doing so would be
futile.' In addition to mandatory reapplication
after the submission of an "exceedingly grand-
iose" proposal, reapplication could also be
required after a "meaningful application" is
made, if a less aggressive prolect may be
accepted." The reapplication prong essentially
requires a landowner to make a good faith
effort to follow the spirit of a regulation, and
not merely jump through a procedural hoop to
get into court and claim a taking.
In its most recent decisions addressing the
issues of reapplication and the finality of a
denial, the Court of Federal Claims has sug-
gested that so long as a landowner has had
occurred due to extreme administrative delay In processing per-
mit applications); Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. CI. 147, 164
(1996) ([Pllaintiffs need not apply for a permit If plaintiffs can
establish that the procedure to acquire a permit is so burden-
some as to effectively deprive plaintiffs of their property rights,').
Notice that. in Stearns. the court did not say that if a permit
or waiver process is overly burdensome then the takings claim Is
merely ripe; rather, it held that if the process is futile or overly
burdensome, then a taking may be established as a matter of law.
See infra note 47 and accompanying text. This seems to fly in the
face of the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Riveside
Bayview Homres, Inc.. 474 U.S. 128 (1985). There, the Court noted
that
lal requirement that a person obtain a permit before
engaging in a certain use of his or her property does
not itself 'take the property in any sense: after all. the
very existence of a permit system implies that permis-
sion may be granted, leaving the landowner free to use
the property as desired Only when a permit is
denied and the effect of the denial is to prevent 'eco-
nomically viable' use of the land in question can it be
said that a taking has occurred.
Id. at 127.
There is, of course, the chance that, In Riverside Bayview
Homes, the Court did not consider thata permitting process could
be so burdensome or futile as to create a taking in itself. Or. per-
haps the Court of Federal Claims felt compelled to let the facial
challenge proceed because contested issues of fact remained.
even though it was dear that the waiver process itself did not
constitute a taking. Or. maybe the court would only be indlined"
to find a taking if the permitting process was extremely burden-
some in cases such as Stears, where mining was almost certain-
ly the only economic use of the subsurface rights and not being
able to obtain a mining permit would be the equivalent of not
one meaningful application denied, a "final
decision" has been made, and no reapplication
is necessary. In all of these cases, the Court of
Federal Claims has been presented with some-
what vague and non-directive denials issued
by the regulating agencies. The court has treat-
ed these ambiguous denials as categorical
denials of all development, inferring that reap-
plication would be futile, and thereby making
the claim ripe.'
In Beure-Co. v. United States, the court con-
cluded that if a denial can "arguably . be
interpreted to indicate an intention to deny"
any future development, or if such a denial
'could . have such a far-reaching effect," then
the denial will be considered a "final decision,"
and reapplication will not be necessaryY2
According to this extreme language, a permit
denial would likely be considered a categorical
denial of all development unless the denial
specifically pointed to modifications that could
be made in the proposal and was supported by
clear evidence that profitable development was
being able to use ones property at all. see. ev.. Eastern Minerals
int'l. Inc. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl, 541 (1996) (taking found
where government's extraordinary delay in processing a mining
permit application rendered mining lease valueless). Beyond
such hypothesizing, it seems that a facial challenge toa waiveror
permitting process will get one past the ripeness hurdle, but may
present a weak case on the merits.
See gp eally Hodel v, Virginia Surface Min. & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S 264, 293-97 (1981) (denying a facial challenge to
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act on ripeness
grounds, and faulting plaintiff for not seeking a waiver).
29 See MocDoiald, 477 U.S. at 352-53 nn.8-9.
30. While there seem to be no cases where the Supreme
Court. Federal Circuit or Court of Federal Claims found a
landowners first application "meaningful, but nonetheless
required reapplication, such an outcome Is possible. For exam-
ple, a landowner might propose a development that is seeming-
ly reasonable, that is. not 'exceedinl grandiose.' but is still
denied, perhaps for relatively minor reasons. In such a case.
reapplication might be required, especially if the regulating
agency made dear in its denial that certain modifications would
yield a passable and economically viable project.
31. As noted above, it Is unclear if the Court of Federal
Claims would require reapplication if it were faced with a denial
that speciflcally detailed measures that the landowner could take
to gain a development permiL Swe discussion supra note 30.
32 16 Cl. Ct. 42, 50 (1988) (emphasis added). The court
recommended that 'to the extent It reasonably can: the permit-
ting agency should -specify the type of development that gener-
ally would be permitted consistentwith the regulations. 14. at 50
n.9. This may be read as a warning to agencies that if they only
provide a vague and open-ended denial, the court will treat it as
a categorical denial of all economic uses.
Fdl 1999
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still available."
In City National Bank of Miami v. United States,
the Corps strongly suggested in its denial letter
that less damaging practicable alternatives
existed, but did not do so with enough specifici-
ty to satisfy the court. Rather than require
reapplication to get a more specific response
from the Corps, the court merely asserted that
"no possibility remains that other types of
development would be allowed."3'
In Formanek v. United States, the court faulted
the government for not producing evidence
showingthat reapplicationwould not have been
futile; by doing so, it assumed reapplicationwas
futile and placed the burden on the government
to prove lack of futility. The' court stated that
"Iblecausethe Corps chose to deny outrightthe
permit application, rather than opting for some
other alternative available to it, and because the
Corps did not suggest any mitigation it is
reasonable for this court to assume that the
Corps believes there are no appropriate or prac-
ticable efforts that plaintiffs can take to obtain
approval of their permit application."'
In sum, the Court of Federal Claims will
probably find that reapplication is unnecessary
if a landowner has submitted a "meaningful
application" and been denied without any spe-
cific guidance from the agency as to how the
project could be permitted. While requiring
multiple reapplications is hypothetically possi-
33. While the above excerpts do not suggest as much,
reapplication might also be necessary where evidence beyond
the face of the denial makes it clear that a less ambitious project
could be accepted, even if the regulating agency did not present
specific suggestions in the denial itself. in all of the cases where
the court has dealt with this issue, neither the permit denial nor
the facts surrounding the case have suggested that reapplication
would be promising.
34. 30 Fed. dl. 715, 717 (1994).
35. Id. at 720.
36. 18 C I. Ct. 785, 792 (1989).
37. Id. at 793.
38. While the Court of Federal Claims seems to have come
up with a discernible doctnne, there is still a great deal of van-
ability and confusion within the other federal courts regarding
reapplication. In contrast to the Court of Federal Claims, which
places the burden on the government to show that reapplication
would have been fruitful, many courts require the landowner to
prove that reapplication would have been futile. See. e.g.. Gilbert
v. City of Cambridge, 932 F.2d 51.61 (Ist. Cir. 1991) ("ITihe burden
of establishing futility must lie with the party seeking to bypass
the permit procedure-and any reasonable doubt ought to be
ble, the Court of Federal Claims has not been so
demanding.8
The above discussion is not meant to sug-
gest that a claim will never ripen if the regulat-
ing agency denies a proposal, but does so by
describingthe proposal's problems in detail. If a
landowner found herself in such a position, she
could assert that such a detailed denial, which
might suggest that a less aggressive proposal
would be accepted, nonetheless constituted a
"final decision," in that it clearly described "the
type and intensity of development legally per-
mitted on the subject property," as the Supreme
Court requires?9 Because this approach forces a
court to initially accept that some level of devel-
opment is possible on the land, it may leave a
landowner with a weaker case on the merits.
However, at trial, the landowner can assert that
because the amount of development allowed is
so minimal or becausethe regulation complete-
ly interferes with investment-backed expecta-
tions, it amounts to a taking.'0
Alternatively, a landowner faced with a
series of detailed denials could claim that pur-
suing further reapplication would be unfair and
contrary to the language in MacDonald, which
states that '[a] property owner is of course not
required to resort to unfair procedures."41
This broad language provides a powerful
weapon for landowners, especially those who
may face the most common example of an
resolved against that party ITIhe mere possibility, or even
probability; that the responsible agency may deny the permit
should not be enough to trigger the excuse."). See also American
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. County of Mann, 653 F2d 364, 371 (9th dir,
1981) (stating that landowner must "bear the heavy burden of
showing that Ireapplicationl would be futile").S' gnerally Berger,
supra note 2 at § 7.03121.
39. MacDonald. 477 U.S. at 348.
40. This would essentially be a "futility" argument, claim-
ing that reapplication should not be required because the only
proposal that would be accepted would be one that was unprof-
itable.
41. MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 350 n.7. Se also Loveladles
Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 386 (1988), aff d, 28
F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994). "Plaintiffs should riot be forced to
resort to... some endless series of requirement;, ICitation omit-
tedl. The requirements of ripeness In the, area of Fifth
Amendment takings also cannot be so extended as to become
more exhaustive than the substantive issues presented by the
taking claim itself." Id. But see Heck v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl,
245,252 (1997) (-IAI plaintiff cannot plead futlllty whenever faced
with long odds or demanding procedural requ rements."), ali'd,
134 F.3d 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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unfair procedure: where a regulating agency
essentially kills a development proposal
through administrative delay and inaction,
without actually denying the application. Such
a situation can put a landowner in the worst
possible position, as development is not per-
mitted, but there is no "final decision" upon
which the landowner can rely for her takings
claim to ripen. For example, even after the
property in Williamson had been tied up in the
administrative process for eight years, the
claim was found unripe.'2
Fortunately, for landowners, the Court of
Federal Claims has recently spoken to this
concern. In the face of extreme delay during
any phase of the application process, a
landowner may be able to secure ripeness by
claiming that further waiting would be futile
or unfair. As the court stated in Eastern
Minerals, "ielxtraordinary delay in the permit
review process can result in a permanent tak-
ing without the necessity of final agency
action. The delay becomes extraordinary at
some point and results in a constructive per-
mit denial that supplants final agency
action.""3 Additionally, in Hage v. United States,
the court noted that the delay in waiting for
the conclusion of a fifteen-year old adjudica-
42. Williamson, 473 U.S. at 177-81.
43. Eastern Minerals, 36 Fed. Ci. at 548. 'Extraordinary gov-
ernment delay may result in a constructive permit denial.
Otherwise, the Government could delay action on a permit Indef-
initely and the property owner would have no recourse: Id at
549.
In Eastern Minerals. not only did the Court of Federal Claims
find the claim ripe due to the Department of interiors delay in
processing plaintiffs mining permit, but the court also found that
'"tIhe property interests of plaintiffs were rendered valueless
through extraordinary delay by the United States." Id at 552.
Consequently, the federal government was doubly penalized for
its perceived delay--in one bold stroke the court found that the
claim was ripe and that there was a taking. 'Plaintiffs satisfy the
economic impact prong lof the takings analysisl where delay Is
truly extraordinary."Id. at 549. This is especially surprising In light
of the fact that the United States finally denied the permit
because Eastern Minerals "had not provided certain information
requested in a technical deficiency letter," which suggests that
some mining might, in fact, have been permitted. Id at 545.
However, the court noted that 'we determined at trial that the
Government had no intention of ever granting the permiL" Id. at
549. See also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
44. Hagev. United States, 35 Fed. Cf. 147. 162 (1996).
45. As an alternative to pursuing a takings claim in the
face of unreasonable delay, a landowner could make a claim
under section 706(l) of the Administrative Procedure Act to
tlon as a prerequisite to the ripening of a
claim 'would make a mockery of the Constitu-
tion's guarantee of both due process and just
compensation." Consequently, while there
are examples of landowners who have
endured years of administrative delay and still
been denied access to court, the Court of
Federal Claims has recently made it clear that
it does not take such administrative inaction
lightly and will presume that extreme delay is
the equivalent of a categorical denial of devel-
opment, thus providing the requisite -final
decision.' 4'
4. Variance
The final element in the ripening of a tak-
ings claim is the requirement that a landown-
er apply for a variance from the regulation lim-
iting her development, if such a procedure is
available within the regulation. As with the
requirement of reapplication, pursuit of a van-
ance or exemption will not be required if
doing so would be futile or would force a
landowner to engage in exceedingly drawn out
or otherwise unfair procedures!' In Stearns Co.,
Ltd. v. United States. the Court of Federal Claims
noted that if a variance procedure is not -rea-
sonable.- then a landowner's claim will ripen
-compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed. 5 US.C. § 706(i). Such a tool allows a perseverant
landowner to force agency action and secure some finality. Of
course, many landowners may find such litigation too burden-
some for too little gain.
46 See Willmmon,473 U.S. at 191 n.12 ('lilt is impossible
to determine the extent of the loss or interference until the freg-
ulating agency] has decided whether it will grant a variance from
the application of the regulations."). See sho Pond Brook
Development v. Twinsburg Township, 35 R Supp. 2d 1025. 1029
(N.D. Ohio 1999) iholding claim not ripe because plaintiff failed
to apply for a variance alter the township rezoned certain dis-
trilcts).
47 See Stearns Co., Ltd. v, United States. 34 Fed. Ci. 264.
272 (1995) ('If the process is a futile one, or so burdensome that
it effectively deprives the property of value, then this court is
Inclined to find that a compensable taking occurred."}.
While the court characterized the process at issue in Searts
as a variance procedure, see d. at 269. It differs in nature from the
variances discussed in most ripeness cases In that in the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act, no permit need be applied
for before one seeks a 'variance:Therefore, the variance process
at Issue in Stvrxs can be seen as analogous to an initial permit.
Nonetheless, whatever the label applied, the Court of Federal
Claims has made it clear that it will not require landownersto go
through burdensome procedures lust to meet the ripeness
requirement.
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without having to pursue the variance."
Consequently, if a landowner applies for a vari-
ance and is denied, or the court believes the
pursuit of a variance would be futile, unfair, or
unreasonable, the claim should be ripe.
In the end, it seems that any landowner
who makes a reasonable effort to pursue a
development permit or seek a variance will not
be turned out of the Court of Federal Claims
because of ripeness. While the Supreme Court
has laid out several thresholds that must be
met before a claim is ripe, all of the require-
ments have been generously interpreted by the
Court of Federal Claims to provide landowners
access to court. Given the court's welcoming
attitude toward landowners, and the language
in MacDonald noting that "[a] property owner is
of course not required to resort to piecemeal
litigation or otherwise unfair procedures,"' it
seems a fair bet that landowners claiming a
taking under the ESA will not be summarily
dismissed from court. 0
III. Proceeding Under the Endangered
Species Act
A. Applying the Doctrine
Because ripeness has never been an issue
in the Court of Federal Claims in an endan-
gered species case, it is not exactly clear what
the court would require a landowner to do
before her claim ripened. However, given the
48. 34 Fed. Ci. 264, 269 (1995). See also Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'i Plan. Agency, 911 F.2d
1331, 1339 (9th Cir. 1990) (I[Als long as the Ivanancel process is
limited and reasonably short in duration, and is guaranteed to
culminate In either a 'yes' or a 'no,' we believe the plaintiffs are
required to pursue It."). This carries the negative implication that
if a variance process Is extremely Involved and produces an
ambiguous outcome, a plaintiff need not go through the
motions,
49. MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 350 n.7.
50. In Hage v. United States, the Court concluded its discus-
sion of ripeness by noting that "denying plaintiffs the opportuni-
ty to bring their taking claims at this time would deny plaintiffs
due process of law." 35 Fed. Cl. at 165. While the court provides
virtually no explanation for this conclusion, the statement pro-
vides additional evidence that the Court of Federal Claims will
accept various legal theories In order to allow landowners to
clear the ripeness hurdle.
5 i. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(Iv). Following the logic of
Lucas, a landowner would not have to pursue an incidental take
permit If It were clear that any proposed development would
jeopardize the survival of the species, consequently making the
way the court has handled wetlands cases, and
the way a District Court in Texas handled an
endangered species case, it does not appear
that ripeness presents a major obstacle in
endangered species takings claims.
In order for a landowner facing develop-
ment restrictions imposed by the ESA to main-
tam a takings claim, the landowner would be
required to apply for a section 10 "incidental
take" permit, unless doing so would be "point-
less."' In Four Points Utility, the U.S. District
Court for western Texas found that a landown-
er challenging the application of the ESA "must
make lan] application for a permit before the
Court may properly consider the merits" of the
claim. 2 This requirement is consistent with
what the Court of Federal Claims has required
of landowners challenging the application of
section 404 of the Clean Water Act." As dis-
cussed earlier, the permit application would
have to be "meaningful" and not merely pro-
pose "exceedingly grandiose" plans." If, howev-
er, a landowner believes that the section 10
permitting process itself is unduly burdensome,
she may avoid the "meaningful application"
requirement and make a facial challenge to the
permitting process, thereby eliminating the
ripeness issue entirely."
If a permit is applied for and denied, reap-
plication would probably only be required if
the initial application was not "meaningful," or,
maybe, if the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service
acceptance of an incidental take permit impossible. See also
Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'i Plan. Agency, 520 U.S. 725. 739-40 (1997).
52. 40 E.R.C. at 15i1.
53. See Conant v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 6E.9 (1987) (claim
found unnpe where landowner made no attempt whatsoever to
seek a development permit and provided Insufficient evidence of
pointlessness and futility).
54. See MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 352-53 nn.8-).
55. See supra notes 28 and 47 and accompanying text.
Another situation where a landowner would probably not
have to apply for an Incidental take permit at all Is when a
landowner has had her development permit application defini-
tively denied by a county, city, or state agency for reasons unre-
lated to an endangered species which Is present cn the property.
Such an application would be pointless because even If the Inci-
dental take permit were granted, the landowner would still be
precluded from developing her property on other grounds. See Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 920 F2d 1496
(9th Cir. 1990) (developers claim was ripe, despite the fact that
endangered butterfly habitat was on land and developer had
never applied for incidental take permit; taking %alued at $1.45
million found in February 1994), al'd 119 S. Ct. 1624 (1999).
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("FWS"). in the initial denial, specifically listed
reasonable measures that the applicant could
take to gain a permit." If the denial was overly
ambiguous or demanded amendments that
would renderthe proposal unprofitable, reappli-
cation would probably not be required, as the
court would likely infer futility. If the permit is
denied and reapplication is not pursued, the
landowner would probably have to make a
request for reconsideration;" and, if the permit
is still denied, the landowner would likely have
to appeal." The ruling of the appeal constitutes
the -final decision," and upon its Issuance, a tak-
ings claim would be ripe."
As to the vanance requirement, it is extreme-
ly unlikely that a private landowner would have
to pursue an exemption from the ESA for her
claim to ripen. Sections 7(g) and 7(h) of the
Endangered Species Act provide for complete
exemptions from the Act, but such exemptions
are only available to "lal Federal agency, the
Governor of the State in which an agency action
will occur, if any, or a permit or license appli-
cant.' Furthermore, such exemptions are based
on the premise that there is some "agency
action- which should proceed unhindered bythe
56. It is an articulated policy of FWS to provide a detailed
denial, so it is unlikely that a denial of an Incidental take permit
would present the vagueness problems found In the wetlands
cases. See U.S. Fish &Wildlife Service, Habitat consenvation Planning
and Incidental Take Permit Processing Handbook 6-26 (Nov. 4. 1996)
(available at <http-Jwww.fws.gov/hcp/hcpbook.htm>) Ihere-
inafter FWS Guidelinesl. In 1999, the FWS and the National Marine
Fishenes Service published a Draft Addendum to the FWS
Guidelines 'to provide I I additional darifying guidance to the
Services for conducting the inadental take permit program
landl to those who are applying for an incidental take permit. 64
Fed. Reg. 11.485 (1999).
Given that extensive negotiations have likely already taken
place between the landowner and the FWS, reapplication would
probably only entail amending the original application, a process
that would generally require much less time. effort and money
than the original application. While the threat of multiple reap-
plications remains, as of 1996, no -incidental take" permit appli-
cant has ever had to follow such a path.Telephone interview with
William Lehman and Cynthia Dohner, Habitat Conservation
Office, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, (March 6. 1996) [hereinafter
Lehman/Dohner Interview]. Additionally, recall that a court may
accept a claim as ripe at any time if it believes that the landown-
er is being forced to follow unfair procedures. See MacDonald, 477
U.S. at 350 n.7.
57. See 50 C.ER. § 13.29(a)-(d).
58. See 50 C.FR. § 13.29(e)-(f). Each of these appeals
processes must be completed by the FWS In forty-five days, pro-
tecting a landowner from protracted Involvement. See 50 C.R §
13.29(d)-(e). If, for some reason, the process became mired In
constraints of the ESA. Consequently, it seems
that exemptions are not generally available to
private landownerswishingto developtheir own
land, as there is no 'agency action- and they are
not the typical "permit or license applicant," pri-
vate parties seeking to use publiclands, such as
mining or grazing permit applicants.
However, according to FWS policy, approved
incidental take permits must go through an
internal section 7 consultation process,' as the
grantingof such a permit requires the authoriza-
tion of the FWS, thereby triggering agency
action. But, a landownerwould only make it to
the section 7 consultation stage if the FWS
found that the proposed habitat conservation
plan ("HCP") was reasonable, while a party can
only apply for an exemption from the Act if the
FWS finds that the agency action under consid-
eration would violate section 7(a)(2) of the Act' 3
Consequently, the only time a landownerwould
find herself in the position where she could apply
for an exemption would be where the FWS ini-
tially accepted her HCP under the terms of sec-
tion 10 of the Act-where the incidental taking
would "not appreciably reduce the likelihood of
the survival and recovery of the species in the
administrative delay, a landowner could nonetheless secure
ripeness by daimlng that the delay was a constructive denial of
her application. See supnw notes 41-45 and accompanying text
59. Amended applications and reapplicationswould prob-
ably have to go through the same administrative appeal before
the denial was considered final, Incidental take permits, in gen-
eral. are distinguishable from the transferable development
rights (TDR) scheme at issue In Siuatui In Saitum. the Court found
that no further decision remained concerning the subject proper-
ty. Instead, the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency had effectively
Issued a -final decision- because no further development was
allowed; the only question that remained was the value of the
TDR credits. 520 UoS, at 733. An Incidental take permit would
rarely embody such a categorical denial of all development with-
in a given area; Incidental take permits are largely open to some
negotiation.
60, 16 U-SC. § 1536(g)-h).See a/so 50 CF.. § 451.02(c).
61- Ste FWS Gwdlrn es supra note 56 at6-12, 6-13.
62. Section 7(a)(2) defines 'agency action" as 'any action
authorized, funded, or carried out by lani agency." 16 U.S.C. §
1536(a{2}, See also 50 CFR. § 450.01. Even though the regulations
promulgated under the ESA do not explicitly state that the FNS
has to conduct an internal consultation after accepting a habitat
conservation plan, FWS's policy to conduct such a consultation
seems a legitimate, though perhaps overly strict, interpretation
of the Act.
63 Ste 16US.C § 1536(g)(1).And. Iplermitorlceseappli-
cant means any person whose application to an agency for a per-
mit or license has been denied pnmarily because of the applica-
tion of section 7(a)(2) of the Act. 50 CFR § 450.01.
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wild"--and then later denied the same HCP
during a section 7 "internal" consultation
because the proposed HCP would jeopardize
the continued existence of a species or
adversely modify critical habitat.6 ' Such a
change of mind seems outrageously unlikely.
Consequently, it is almost a certainty that a
landowner would not have to apply for a sec-
tion 7 exemption before her claim was ripe.
For the sake of argument, however, let us
assume that a landowner found herself in the
situation described above and had the oppor-
tunity to apply for an exemption-the worst
case scenario for a landowner trying to clear
the ripeness hurdle. Even in such a remark-
able situation, the landowner would probably
not have to apply for such an exemption, as
section 7 only allows exemptions for projects
deemed to be "of regional or national signifi-
cance."' Consequently, virtually all landown-
ers could assert that pursuit of an exemption
would be futile given the limited scope of
their proposed projects, thereby rendering
their takings claims ripe.
For those few large landowners whose
projects may, in fact, be "of regional or nation-
al significance," and find themselves subject
to the FWS change-of-mind described above,
pursuing a section 7 exemption would likely
be required for a claim to ripen. In such situ-
ations, the landowner's claim becomes ripe
for review when either the Secretary of the
Interior, or the Endangered Species Commit-
tee denies the application for the exemption. 7
While there are multiple steps involved in this
process, full exemptions are rarely available
and strict timelines protect landowners from
64. 16U.S.C. §1539(a)(2)(B)(iv).
65. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). If an incidental take permit
applicant had her application denied by the FWS for failing to
meet the requirements of section 10, it would be futile for the
landowner to apply for an exemption, as one may only apply for
an exemption after proceeding through the section 7 consultation
process, and section 7 assumes that the permitting agencywould
approve the proposed project. If the FWS denies an incidental
take permit application under section 10, it is clear that the per-
mitting agency, the FWS, would not approve the proposed proj-
ect, such that the internal consultation would never happen, and
the exemption would not be available.
66. 16 U.S.C.§I 536(h)JI)(A)(iii).
67. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(g)(3)(B), (h)(i)(A). See also 50
C.F.R. §§ 452.03(c), 453.03(a).
undue delay." Alternatively, a landowner
could claim that the exemption process is
unfair or unreasonable, thereby rendering the
claim ripe without going through the section
7 exemption process. 9
Given the almost inconceivable prerequi-
sites necessary for a landowner to pursue a
section 7 exemption, a claim will generally
ripen after an incidental take permit is denied,
and the denial upheld on adrministrative
appeal.
B. The HCP Process as Implemented
If a landowner chose to pursue an inci-
dental take permit, the typical path she would
follow would be to: 1) engage in negotiations
with the FWS over the proposed development,
discussing possibilities for mitigating impacts
on endangered or threatened species, 2) draft
and submit an HCP, other required papers,
and a twenty-five dollar fee, 3) wait while the
public submits comments and the FWS
engages in a section 7 internal consultation,
4) receive a letter from the FWS either issuing
or denying a permit, and, if denied, 5) amend
the application, reapply, and/or pursue an
administrative appeal.
While the process described above has
the potential to become drawn out and expen-
sive, the actual implementation o- section 10
permitting presents a very encouraging pic-
ture. Out of the 269 HCPs that have been fully
reviewed since the program's Inception, only
one application has been denied by the FWS,'
As to the permit that was denied, the Robert
Edgar Turkey Farm, the landowner made no
attempt to appeal the denial, amend his
68. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 451.02(d)(2), (f)(2i, §§ 45203(a),
452.08(b), 453.03(a).
69. See supra notes 47 and 48 and accompanying text.
70. Telephone Interview with Jim Browning, Division of
Conservation Planning, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (Feb. i1,
2000) [hereinafter Browning Interviewl. In addition to the 269
HCP permits which have been approved as of February 2000,
approximately 200 more are being developed, Set FWS, HCP Plans
(visited Feb. I1, 2000) <httpiJ/ecos.fws.gov/hcpjreport/hcp-sum-
mary.html?region=9&module=421&view=link> Most of the
HCPs that have been approved to date individually cover areas
less than 1000 acres. However, as of 1999, approximately fourteen
HCPs ranged from 10,000 to 100,000 acres, t.en ranged from
100.000 to 500,000, and one covered 1,000,000 acres, See FWS,
Habitat Conservation Plans and the Incidental Take Permitting (visited
Feb. 11, 2000) <http-J/endangered.fws.gov/hcp/hcpplanhtml>
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application or reapply, and never pursued a
takings claim."' Aside from the single denial,
only thirty-three HCPs have been amended.7
Most of these amendments have been initiated
by landowners who wish to obtain additional
permits for other species, or modify the param-
eters of their development, such as adjusting a
boundary or adding units to a development.
None of the amendments have raised any tak-
ings issues or questions of ripeness.
Consequently, while the implementation of the
incidental take program could cause ripeness
problems for landowners, it has never done so,
and only shows signs of becoming more effi-
cient and inexpensive.'
In response to landowners' concerns that
the HCP process requires extreme commit-
ments of time and money, the FWS stream-
lined the application procedures. Consequen-
tly, small landowners may be able to engage in
the process without extreme delay or serious
financial investment. The FWS handbook for
HCP implementation states that "an important
principle of the handbook is that permit appli-
cation processing requirements for low-effect
HCPs will be substantially simplified and
permit issuance for such HCPs will be expedit-
ed to the maximum extent possible consistent
with federal law."7" Based on this principle, the
FWS has committed to a timetable for review-
ing applications. According to this table, the
FWS intends on processing "low-effect" HCPs
in three months, "medium-effect" HCPs in five
months, and "high-effect or regional" HCPs in
ten months.75 While these processing times are
71. Mr. Edgar's HCP was denied because he proposed to
mitigate the impacts from his farmwith unrealized profits that he
expected to gai in the future.The FWS felt that such funding was
too speculative and therefore denied the initial application.
72. See Browning Interview, supra note 70.
73. See FWS, HCP Database. (visited Feb. 1 , 2000) <http:I
ecos.fws.gov/hcp.reportlhcpsummary.html?reglon=9&mod-
ule=421&view=linlo> While the current implementation of the
HCP program seems to be reasonable and effective, an accurate
analysis of the program as a whole may be premature, as most
HCPs are quite recent and have not been time-tested. See TMOThY
BFA"LEY, HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING: ENDANGERED SPECIES AND
URBN GROwTh 216 (1994).
74. FWS Guidelints, supra note 56, at 1-9.
75. Seeid.at1-14.
76. See 64 Fed. Reg. 11.485; Browning Interview, supra note
70.
not legally binding, it is clear that the FWS is
making a real effort to meet the needs of
landowners. Such efforts are visible around the
country: whereas only 23 permits were issued
between 1983 and 1993, 90 were issued in 1995
alone, and an additional 179 have been issued
to date." While landowners may have found
the HCP process cumbersome and taxing in
the past, recent implementation of the pro-
gram shows that many complaints may no
longer be valid.
IV. Clarifying the Elements of the Ripeness
Test
A. Meaningful Application
I. The Application Itself
The 'meaningful application" prong of the
ripeness test is the first hurdle that a landown-
er must clear before a takings claim is deemed
ripe, and perhaps the least complex of all the
elements of ripeness. Nonetheless, what con-
stitutes a 'meaningful application- could stand
to be clarified.
Currently, the only guidance that lower
courts have is that an application must be
"meaningful," and cannot be "exceedingly gran-
diose."' In deciding if a permit application
passes this test, a court should ask whether the
landowner submitted a proposal that had a fair
chance of being accepted by the regulating
agency. Answering this requires the court to
conduct a fact specific inquiry, considering
both the nature of the regulations and the
scope of the proposal, as well as the clarity and
In addition to streamlining the HCP process, the
Department of the Interior has introduced other refornsto meet
the concerns of landowners Among the most significant of these
are- 1) a presumptive exemption from the Act for those activities
affecting threatened species that take place on five acres or less;
0 CFR, pt. 17 (1998); 2] a safe harbor policy, where landowners
are encouraged to improve habitat on their land, and are insulat-
ed from restrictions if they later need to bring their land back to
its previous condition, see. eg. North Carolina's Sandhill Region
Red-Cockaded Woodpecker HCP- and 3) a 'No Surpnses policy
where FWS and the National Marine Fisheries Service will not.
after an HCP has been completed, require additional changes
beyond the level otherwise agreed to in the HCP. See 63 Fed. Reg.
8859 (to be codified at 50 CER. f 17.22,222.22).
See also B.ATLY. supra note 73. at 196-217 (discussing areas
of concern within the HCP process and recommendations for
future implementation).
77 MacDonald. 477 U.S. at 352-53 nn.8-9.
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detail of the proposal itself. If a landowner
submits a poorly drafted or overly vague pro-
posal, or one that goes far beyond what would
be permitted consistent with the regulations in
question, when there are obviously economi-
cally viable less grandiose proposals, the court
should deem a claim unripe for failing to meet
the "meaningful application" requirement.
For the most part, this determination
should not be too difficult to make, but the
court must treat this first hurdle seriously. As
discussed below, if, and only if, an application
has been deemed not "meaningful" should a
landowner be required to reapply before her
claim is ripe. Consequently, while the "mean-
ingful application" requirement is a relatively
minor hurdle, it has a major impact on whether
a landowner should be allowed to proceed with
her claim.
2. Pointlessness
While the Supreme Court made it clear in
Lucas that a landowner need not apply for a
development permit if it would be "pointless,"78
the Court did not explicitly state who should
bear the burden of proving that application
would be pointless or worthwhile. Yet, it seems
clear that there should be a general presump-
tion that an application is not pointless. To
presume the contrary would subject adminis-
trative agencies to constant challenge and sig-
nificantly impede their ability to fulfill their
regulatory duties." Only when a landowner can
show that a particular application would be
pointless should the court deem a claim ripe
when there has been no application whatsoev-
er.'
As to the meaning of "pointless," or "futile"
for that matter, the courts must take care not to
define these words too narrowly. Clearly, appli-
cation should be deemed "pointless," and re-
application deemed "futile," when an agency
has been clear that it will accept no develop-
78. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, i014 (1992).
79. The Court of Federal Claims seems to err too far in
favor of landowners, faulting agencies for not suggesting or
encouraging application. See Broadwater Farms, 35 Fed. ci. at 235
(the Corps "did not suggest that Broadwater Farms could apply
for a permit ").
ment on the subject property. Yet, the courts
should also entertain "pointlessness" and
"futility" arguments by a landowner if she
alleges that her application or reapplication
might be accepted by the regulating agency,
but only at such a low level of development
that a taking would nonetheless occur. For
example, even though the Sou:h Carolina
Coastal Council would probably have accepted
a permit application from Mr. Lucas to build a
tool shed on his property, the Supreme Court
did not require Mr. Lucas to make such an
application. Some development would surely
have been accepted, but only such a small
amount that the government had nonetheless
taken his property. Any time that a court
believes that the amount of development an
agency might allow is so insignificant as to
constitute a taking, it should accept a land-
owner's claims that application would be
"pointless," or reapplication "futi' e."11
3. Unfair or Unreasonable Procedures
While the Supreme Court noted In
MacDonald that "la] property owner is of course
not required to resort to unfair procedures,"
the Court did not discuss what might consti-
tute unfair procedures or how a court should
deal with a landowner who faced such proce-
dures. 2 The Court of Federal Claims, however,
has recently expressed some doctrine on the
subjects of unreasonable variance procedures
and administrative delay, though it has not
explicitly tied its doctrine to the above lan-
guage in MacDonald.3 Based on these recent
holdings, the following rule seems reasonable:
if a landowner can prove that a particular
agency's procedures will demand, or already
have demanded an inordinate amount of time,
effort, or money, then a court should deem the
unfair procedures a constructive permit denial,
find the claim ripe, and allow a landowner to
proceed to the merits of her takings claim.
80. See Heck v. United States, 37 Fed, cl. 245, 252 (1997)
affd, i34 F3d 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
81. See Definitive but Not Categoncal Denials discussion infra,
Section IV.B.2.
82. MacDonald. 477 U.S. at 350 n.7,
83. See discussion of cases supra notes 28, 41-45.
.'I"
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Absent such a rule, agencies who wish to deny
development would have the incentive to tie-up
applications indefinitely, thereby avoiding those
takings claims which would otherwise ripen upon
their denial of the applications.'
After convincing a court that she has been, or
will be subjected to unfair procedures, a land-
owner should still have to prove the substantive
elements of her takings claim. As discussed earli-
er, the Court of Federal Claims recently held that
extreme delay in the administrative process not
only renders a claim ripe, but also may establish
a taking as a matter of law.8' This has no founda-
tion in Supreme Court precedent and could lead
to illogical outcomes if broadly applied.M
Consequently, if a landowners permit applica-
tion is caught up in unfair or unreasonable pro-
cedures, the court should presume that the
agency has denied the application, and then pro-
ceed to consider the merits of the takings claim."
B. Final Decision
As discussed earlier,; there is language in
MacDonald and Williamson which suggests that an
84. See Eastern Minerals, 36 Fed. CI. at 549 ('Extraordinary
government delay'may result in a constructive permit denial.
Otherwise, the Government could delay action on a permit indef-
initely and the property owner would have no recourse.').
85. See id. ('Plaintiffs satisfy the economic Impact prong
lof the takings analysis] where delay is truly extraordinary.). See
also supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
86. For example, a landowner seeking to build a mall on
her property could be caught in an 'unfair' administrative
process for years, but still have substantial economic uses of her
land unrelated to the proposed mall development such as resi-
dential home developmentand timber harvesting. If a landowner
could pursue such activities even if the mall proposal were cate-
goncallydenied, it makes little sense to conclude that the admin-
istrative delay associated with the mall proposal denied her eco-
nomic use of the property. Additionally, even if a permit denial did
satisfy the economic impact prong, a landowner might nonethe-
less be lacking the requisite investment-backed expectation that
development could be permitted on the subject property. See
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City. 438 U.S. 104. 124 (1978)
Therefore, a constructive permit denial, caused by unfair or
unreasonable procedures, should only establish a taking as a
matter of law when the constructive denial effects a Lucas-style
categorical taking. See, e.g.. Steams Co.. Ltd. v. United States, 34
Fed. Ci. 264 (1995) (plaintiff only owned mineral estate, such that
a constructive permit denial caused by unreasonable procedures
would be the equivalent of a categorical taking). See supra note 28
and accompanying text.
87. In order to avoid over-penalizing a regulatory agency.
which may be chronically under funded and little to blame for its
-unfair- procedures or administrative delay, a court could allow
the agency to overcome the presumption that the permit appli-
cation in question would have been eventually denied. That is, if
agency denial must be quite detailed, explaining
exactly what level of development would be per-
mitted on the subject property, before a decision
is deemed 'final." Both the Supreme Court and
Court of Federal Claims, however, have found
claims ripe when the denials being reviewed
failed to explain the reason for denial, and/or
failed to describe the intensity of development
that could ultimately be permitted on the subject
property." Unfortunately, neither court has
expressed any clear and consistent doctrine on
how to deal with such vague denials.
Furthermore, neither court has expressed any
doctrine regarding denials which clearly explain
the faults of a -meaningful application,- and
describe what sort of development could ulti-
mately be accepted on the subject property.
Given that regulating agencies will continue to
issue denials of all forms, the judiciary must
articulate a predictable and rational ripeness
doctrine for the full range of permit denials.
1. Vague Denials
Landowners, and eventually courts, are often
the regulating agency provides evidence that clearly establishes
that the permit application could be accepted as submitted and
remain consistent with the regulations in question, the court
could fashion a remedy whereby the regulating agency would be
required to permit the proposed development, and perhaps only
pay for a temporary taking incurred by the period of extreme
delay or otherwise unfair procedures. See First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v Los Angeles County
482 U.S. 304. 321 t1987J (i'Wlhere the government's activities
have already worked a taking of all use of property, no subse-
quent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to pro-
vide compensation for the period during which the taking was
effective.'). But see the court's additional statement.-lwle do
not deal with the quite different questions that would anse in the
case of nonxil delays in obtaining building permits, changes in
zoning ordinances, variances, and the like which are not before
us' It (emphasis added)-
Aside from a temporary takings claim, the landowner could
make a substantive due process claim for extremely unfair proce-
dures or prolonged delay. See. e g. Committee of Us. Citizens in
Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F2d 929 (DC cir 1988J. 'Substantive
due process prevents 'governmental power from being used for
purposes of oppression, or 'abuse of government power that
shocks the conscience, or -action that is legally irrational in that
it is not sufficiently keyed to any legitimate state interests." Id. at
943.
88 See supra notes 13-14 andaccompanying text.
89 See. eg Penn Cent- Transp Co. v New York City 438
U.S 104 (1978). See als City Nat I Bank of Miami v United States,
30 Fed. Cl 715 (1994). Formanekv, United States, 18 Ci. Ct. 785
(1989)Ciampettiv UnitedStates, i8Ci Ct. 5481 198911; Beure-Co.
v. United States, 16 CI Ct. 42 (i19881
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faced with permit denials where the regulating
agency states that the proposed development
is unacceptable, but provides almost no expla-
nation for the denial, nor suggests any modifi-
cations that would yield a passable prolect.1 If
the regulating agency denies a meaningful
application in such a vague and unhelpful
manner, there should be a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the decision is a categorical
denial of any development, and therefore a
reviewable final decision." While the Supreme
Court stated in MacDonald that a final decision
must provide an "authoritative determination
of the type and intensity of development legal-
ly permitted on the sublect property,"' even a
denial that does not describe the level of
development which would ultimately be per-
mitted should be deemed a final decision.9
To avoid a flood of unsubstantiated takings
claims, however, a regulating agency should be
able to overcome the presumption that its
denial is categorical by pointing to evidence,
beyond the face of the denial itself, which
shows that a less aggressive economically
viable prolect would be accepted. Elements to
be considered by the court should include for-
mal and informal communications and negoti-
ations between the parties, and agency treat-
ment of similarly situated properties.94 The
court should also consider the relative willing-
ness of the parties to cooperate. For example,
if a developer has made little effort to comply
with the regulations, such as continually sub-
mitting "exceedingly grandiose" proposals, or
fails to heed recommendations from the regu-
90. See cases cited supra note 89.
91. The Court of Federal Claims seems to have adopted
such an approach, but has yet to state the rule in explicit terms.
See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
92. MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 348.
93. While this interpretation may seem to stray from the
above language in MacDonald. and also from language in
Williamson. see supra note 13, it is exactly the path the Supreme
Court followed in Penn Central. There, the court found the takings
claim ripe as to the denial of a proposed fifty-story addition to
the Grand Central Terminal, even though the denial provided no
clear explanation of how much development the Landmarks
Preservation commission would actually permit. Penn Cent.
Transp. Co.. 438 U.S. 104, 136-37 (1978).
94. A court might also consider agency testimony that
demonstrates that certain specific modifications to the proposal
would meet the requirements of the regulations and still provide
an economically viable use of the property. The nsk of allowing
lating agency, a plea of ripeness should be dis-
favored. Conversely, if an agenc- makes no
effort to direct or assist a diligent and cooper-
ative developer, ripeness should be favored."
In sum, a vague denial should present an ini-
tial presumption that the regulating agency
intends to deny all use of the property, but the
court should consider various factors beyond
the face of the denial to test the validity of that
presumption.
The purpose of having such a presumption
is to encourage agencies to provide detailed
denials so that landowners may pursue what-
ever development is consistent with the regu-
lations in question, or claim a taking if no
development will actually be allowed. Without
such a presumption, agencies may be encour-
aged to provide vague denials, when they actu-
ally intend categorical denials, thereby pre-
venting all development without paying the
necessary compensation. Short of that, agen-
cies may string landowners along, providing
vague denial after vague denial, in order to
keep the land in an undeveloped state as long
as possible and discourage further application,
even though some development could be
accepted. A presumption in favor of ripeness
will nudge agencies toward giving specific
denials, thereby aiding landowners in reaching
some certainty as to the future of their land.6
2. Definitive but Not Categorical
Denials
Beyond finding a claim ripe after a land-
owner receives a vague denial, as discussed
such "new' evidentiary material to be used to o'vercome the pre-
sumption is that it may reduce the initial Incentive for an agency
to provide a detailed denial. That is. an agency may keep its
denials ambiguous and forestall development if It knows that It
can safely clarify such denials if and when a takings claim is
made.
95. Recent proposed legislation would obviate the need
for such analysis The legislation simply finds a claim against the
U.S. ripe if one meaningful application was submitted but not
approved and one appeal or waiver has not been approved. See
Private Property Implementation Act of 1999 H.R. 2372, 106th Cong. §
3 (1999); Citizen's Access to justice Act of 1999, S. 1028, 106th Cong, §
6(1999).
96. One danger with Imposing such a presumption Is that
by deeming a denial categorical at the pleading :;tage of a case, a
court may unexpectedly force itself to find a taking later in the lit-
igation. For example, a court cannot say that a claim Is ripe
because the permit denial effectively prohibits all viable uses of
the property, and later find that there Is no taking, as that would
Jomes Rosen Numoe 6, Number I
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above, courts should even find a claim ripe if a
.meaningful application" is definitively denied
in a very specific manner; i.e., the denial out-
lines what is wrong with the original proposal
and suggests specific changes that would yield
an acceptable project.Y Such an interpretation
of the "final decision" prong would present ripe
claims where landowners have received denials
and believe it would be futile to reapply, not
because no development would be permitted,
but because they believe anything less than
their initial proposals would constitute takings.
For example, if the FWS denies an incidental
take permit on the ground that a proposed
multi-dwelling development would be incon-
sistent with the protection of a given species,
and the landowner believes that such a limita-
tion is enough to constitute a taking, then the
court should not requirethe landownerto reap-
ply, even if the denial letter makes clear that a
single-dwelling development would be accept-
ed. While the Supreme Court noted in Hamilton
that 'a court cannot determine whether a regu-
lation has gone 'too far' unless it knows how far
the regulation goes," a court really only needs
to know if the regulation has gone far enough to
constitute a taking. Any effect beyond the point
of taking is irrelevant for a takings analysis.
If courts accept such an interpretation of
the "final decision" prong and find claims ripe
when some development may in fact be permit-
ted on the sublect property, they must limit the
inquiry at trial to the extent of the initial denial.
That is, if a property owner believes that the
be inconsistent with the rule of categorical takings See Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal council. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). However.
such a situation would probably not anse if the original applica-
tion applied to only a portion of the subject property while the
takings claim applied to the economicviability of the entire prop-
erty. Similarly, if a landowner only pursued a particular type of
development and the FWS reiected such development due to the
impact upon an endangered species, a court might find the claim
ripe due to a vague denial, but nonetheless find no taking if it
were clear that an entirely different type of developmentwas eco-
nomically viable and did not unduly harm an endangered
species. Of course, in such a case, the FWS would have a good
chance of overcoming the initial presumption of the denial being
categorical.
97. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
"Definitively" means here that the denial has gone through
all the regulating agency's administrative processes, thereby ren-
dering it the "final decision" as to the particular proposal. Rather
than interpreting -final" to mean the ultimate decision as to any
and all potential development on the subject property. I interpret
denial of a certain level of development consti-
tutes a taking, then the court must limit its
judgment to that claim. The court should not
guess what the agency would ultimately accept
or deny and then perform a takings analysis on
such hypotheticals, because doing so would
completely defeat the purposes of the ripeness
doctrine. If, in the above hypothetical, the FWS
can prove at trial that building a single home
would arguably be consistent with the ESA and
would provide a reasonable economic return,
then the court should find against the landown-
er, even if the agency might not actually accept
such a lesser proposal.* Filing a takings claim
after one denial, where some development may
still be permitted may be a foolish tactic for a
landowner, given the difficulty of proving a tak-
ing, but ripeness should not prevent a
landowner from moving forward. This interpre-
tation of the "final decision" prong puts the
power and risk into the hands of the landowner
-she may make a takings claim at any time
after the denial of a "meaningful application,"
but faces the risk of presenting a weak case on
the merits.M "
3. Summary
To be final, the decision must pass all the
way through the administrative procedure that
evaluates the application, but it need not be
categorical nor explain exactly what level of
development would be permitted. Of course.
any denial that is both definitive and categori-
cal will certainly render a claim ripe. Short of
-final* to mean the ultimate decision on any particular proposal.
Therefore. once an agencydenies a meaningful application, there
is the necessary'final decision,' If a landowner has a dental that
Is not yet definitive, then the landowner will have to wait for the
agency's decision-making process to finish, or claim that the
process Is so unfair that the claim should be deemed npe. See
supra notes 4 1-45. 84-87 and accompanying text,
98. The regulating agency must be limited to proposing
alternative developments that are at least plausibly consistent
with the regulations in question, Otherwise, agencies could pro-
pose all sorts of uses and development, even though it would be
futile for the landowner to actually apply for permits for such
projects.
99 See. eq Good v United States. 39 Fed, Cl 81 (1997)
(holding claim npe even though no reapplication was made, but
denying takings claim on the merits where plaintiff took an "all or
nothing approach" in challenging land use regulations based on
endangered species protections). #i'd, 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir.
1999)
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that, if a denial is definitive, but ambiguous, it
should be presumed categorical. And, finally,
even if a denial is definitive and perfectly pre-
sented--clearly describing the faults of the ini-
tial application and suggestingthat a particular
level of development would be accepted-the
denial should nonetheless be deemed final and
the landowner should be allowed to proceed to
the merits, claiming a taking only as to the
extent of the denial. While there are certainly
various types of denials that fall within the gaps
of the above doctrine, the suggested rules out-
line the approach for the most extreme possi-
bilities and provide at least some guidance for
both landowners and regulatory agencies.
C. Reapplication
If a court adopts the permissive interpreta-
tion of the "final decision" prong described
above, a landowner should never be required to
reapply as a prerequisite to having a ripe claim,
unless a court finds that the first application is
not "meaningful." According to the doctrine
suggested above, if a landowner submits a
"meaningful application" and is denied in a
vague manner, the court will deem the denial
categorical, and effectively render reapplication
futile-assuming that the regulating agency
does not overcome the presumption of the
denial being categorical. Also following the
above doctrine, if a landowner claims that the
denial of her first application was final because
anything less than the proposed development
would be a taking, the court should presume
that reapplication would be futile and allow the
claim to proceed to the merits. As mentioned
above, if the regulating agency can show at trial
that there exists an economically viable project
that is consistent with the regulations, the
agency will effectively prove that reapplication
was not futile and the court should find against
the landowner on the merits. In sum, if a
landowner has cleared the basic hurdle of pre-
senting a "meaningful application," and had the
proposal denied, reapplication might be pru-
dent, but it should not be demanded by the
court for the sake of ripeness.
100. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
D. Variance
The "variance" prong of the ripeness test is
similar to the "meaningful application" prong
and should be treated in the same manner."
That is, a variance must be pursued and
denied before a claim is ripe, unless pursuing
it would be "pointless," or the variance process
itself is exceedingly unfair or unreasonable. As
with the initial application, there should be a
rebuttable presumption that the procedure is
not futile or unreasonable. Put simply, a claim
should become ripe if the landowner has a
variance application denied, or can convince
the court that pursuing a variance would be
"pointless" or unreasonable.
V. Conclusion
Given that ripeness has been a barrier to
landowners challenging local zoning laws, var-
ious property rights advocates and legal com-
mentators have painted a picture :f a ludiciary
that is hostile to hearing legitimate takings
claims.'"' Consequently, landowners may fear
that they will receive similar treatment in try-
ing to challenge federal laws and regulations,
especially the ESA. However, neither the Court
of Federal Claims nor the Federal Circuit has
ever denied a landowner access to court for
failing to present a ripe takings claim under
the ESA.
Critics may believe that the lack of cases
dismissed on ripeness grounds is an inaccu-
rate gauge of the impediment that ripeness
presents, and that most landowners whose
property has been taken by the ESA are
deterred from bringing claims at all because
their lawyers recognize that they will not be
able to clear the ripeness hurdle. I would sug-
gest two responses to this argument. 1) such
landowners need to find lawyers who do not
present such a gloomy picture of ripeness in
the Court of Federal Claims, and 2) if such
landowners could have secured an incidental
take permit but made no effort to obtain one,
then their claims are indeed not ripe and
should not be treated as such.
101. See sources cited supra note 2.
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As to the first point, the premise that the
Court of Federal Claims often denies takings
claims on ripeness grounds is simply inaccu-
rate. When one examines recent wetlands tak-
ings cases, of which there are several, a sur-
prising conclusion may be drawn: the Court of
Federal Claims has generously interpreted the
Supreme Court's ripeness doctrine, at times
seeming to invite disgruntled landowners into
court. While the Endangered Species Act cer-
tainly differs from the Clean Water Act, there
are no apparent differences that suggest the
court will distinguish between landowners
making ESA claims and those with wetlands
claims. Therefore, while neither the Court of
Federal Claims nor the Federal Circuit haves
grappled with many claims under the ESA,
there is little reason for landowners to fear that
they will be unfairly denied access to court
because of ripeness.
Second, as a matter of good public policy,
landowners should be willing to make a rea-
sonable effort to go through the incidental take
permitting process. While the process does
consume time and money, this alone should
not be enough for a landowner to claim a tak-
ing. We live in a society that attempts to pro-
tect both public and private interests, and cer-
tain obligations accompany the benefits indi-
viduals derive from this system. 2 Of course,
this is-not to suggest that the ripeness doctrine
should put property owners at the mercy of
102. A recent bill proposing revisions to the ESA seeks to
codify the radical premise that public values must be paid for.
Under the bill. any implementation of the ESA that reduces the
value of even a portion of a landowners property'by an amount
equal to or greaterthan fifty percentwill require the government
to compensate the landowner. H.R. 495. 106th Cong. § 13(a)
(1999). Obviously, under such a strategy, the government will
have to increase the tax burden on the general populace, or, more
likely, choose not to protect endangered species.
arbitrary and unfair regulators. Rather, the doc-
trine has several safety valves-pointlessness.
futility, and freedom from engaging in unfair
practices-that protect landowners from
unreasonable regulation. Further, the Court of
Federal Claims has been extremely generous in
applying the doctrine, such that all but the
most recalcitrant and obstructionist landown-
ers have cleared the ripeness hurdle.
It seems unfair to ask for any more from the
courts, or the legislature. The incidental take
permitting process is a mechanism that was
created to help landowners, while still protect-
ing publicly-valued endangered species. " '
Now, the flexibility and cooperative nature of
the program is being criticized as an obstacle
by the same landowners. Property owners
should recognize that unrestncted develop-
ment is not an absolute right and, from there,
circumvent pursue development through the
section 10 permitting process. If they make a
reasonable effort and their application is
denied, then the property owner will be able to
gain access to the courts and claim a taking. If
the permit application is accepted, then both
the private and public interests have been
served, and there has been no taking. This is
the result that we should hope for, and any
attempt to undermine the ripeness doctnne or
expand the right to compensation reduces the
possibility of such an outcome.
103 Sm Bwr , supri note 73. at 195-96. "lTlhe HCP
device has served as a pressure valve and has added some need-
ed flexibility to ESA, promoting compromise and negotiated set-
tlements between the development and environmental commu-
nities in particular,where confrontation and litigation would have
been the likely alternatives.... It is also remarkable how well the
HCP process is functioning in many places, given the potential
volatility of the different community factions and stakeholders
Involved" Id
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